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What are best practices and models of cooperation against transnational organized crime? For 
25 years, the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) provides an important example of how states 
can collaborate to counter money laundering. Anti-money laundering policies are used against 
criminals and terrorists, and seem to be a prime example of effective coordination among states. 
As a result, the FATF and its anti-money laundering efforts have often been conceived as a 
prototype of global governance and of global governance networks1. A main characteristic of 
the FATF network is the large number of different actors that are coordinated, including states, 
international organizations and non-governmental actors.  
 
This article examines whether the success of the FATF can be replicated in other areas of global 
crime governance. This is not a primarily theoretical question, but linked to political debates 
                                                 
1 Jason C. Sharman, The Money Laundry. Regulating Criminal Finance in the Global Economy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2011); Christine Jojarth, Crime, War and Global Trafficking. Designing International 
Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Dieter Kerwer and Rainer Hülsse, "'How 
International Organizations Rule the World: The Case of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering," 
Journal of International Organization Studies 2, no. 1 (2011): 50-67; Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Global Public 
Policy. Governing without Government? (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A 
New World Order (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004).  
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that might use the FATF as a model institution for other areas of global crime governance. For 
instance, the United States mentioned the FATF in the 2011 White Paper on Cybersecurity as 
an important example on how to establish cooperation in matters of cybercrime and 
cybersecurity.2 While lessons are drawn on the FATF, there is little research on which lessons 
this network is actually able to teach.   
 
Presenting the FATF network and its development, this article argues that the transferability of 
the FATF is limited. It is not an ideal model for future global governance efforts, as its success 
is highly dependent on its specific background and its specific capabilities. For instance, similar 
network initiatives are likely to be perceived more critically today by other states, which will 
make it difficult to gain the momentum the FATF has had. Also, commitment to the FATF 
exists for different reasons and is not only related to finding criminals. Future global policy 
networks are unlikely to create a similar amount of benefits to members, and weaker 
commitment to them can be expected. At worst, focusing on the FATF might mislead states 
and other actors (including researchers) to expecting too much from global policy networks.  
 
                                                 
2 Robert K. Knake Internet Governance in an Age of Cybersecurity (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 
2010), 18-19.; President of the United States International Strategy for Cyberspace. Prosperity, Security and 
Opennes in a Networked World (Washington: White House, 2011), 20. In September 2014, a Joint Taskforce on 
Cybercrime was set up by cybersecurity centers from the United States, Canada, Europe and other states. The 
model seems to share some characteristics with the FATF initiation (e.g. the United States as initiator, the 
temporary mandate and the selective membership), but details of its operation are widely unknown so far; “Expert 
International Cybercrime Taskforce is launched to tackle online crime”, National Crime Agency, London 
(http://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/news-listings/435-expert-international-cybercrime-taskforce-is-
launched-to-tackle-online-crime, accessed 7 November 2014). 
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To show this in detail, this article traces the transformation of the anti-money laundering 
agenda from a foreign policy of the United States to a global discourse and an almost universal 
weapon against crime.3 The first section presents the role of global policy networks and how 
they can be established. I outline two major difficulties of establishing global networks – 
initiation problems and commitment problems. The second section shows how and why the 
FATF was initiated, emphasizing the crucial role of the United States. The third section 
elaborates on the instruments used to ensure commitment, in particular how monitoring and 
oversight has been socialized in the FATF. The fourth section presents reasons related to 
incentives and commitment that are obstacles to replicating the FATF. The conclusions 
summarize the weak points of the FATF network in terms of transferability, outline some ways 
to overcome these and present further questions for research.  
 
The article is related to the existing research on the FATF, which has multiplied over the last 
years, yet often does not elaborate on limits of the FATF in terms of policy lessons. By 
addressing the question of whether and how the FATF is replicable in other contexts of global 
crime governance, the article carries out a secondary analysis of the available research and 
sources, and supplements the existent literature from a more policy-oriented perspective. The 
                                                 
3 Jason C. Sharman, "Power, Discourse and Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money Laundering in Developing States" 
International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2008): 635-656.; Ian Roberge, “Bringing the United States Back In: A 
Response to Rainer Hülse's ‘Creating Demand for Global Governance …’”, Global Society 23, no. 2 (2009): 177-
181.; Daniel Drezner, All Politics is Global (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Eleni Tsingou, "Global 
Financial Governance and the Developing Anti-Money Laundering Regime: What lessons for the International 
Political Economy," International Politics 47, no. 6 (2010): 617-637; Ines Oliveira “Catch me if you can: Or how 
Policy Networks help tackle the Crime-Terror Nexus.” Global Crime 15 no. 3-4 (2014): 219-240.    
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analysis has important implications, as future models of global governance networks might fail 
if they are modelled as a copy of the FATF, but are actually based on different preconditions.  
 
 
Global Networks and Global Crime Governance  
 
International cooperation was for many decades primarily treaty-based interaction of states 
with defined commitments and benefits.4 Since the end of the Cold War, however, also 
informal ways of cooperation or ‘soft law’ have grown continuously, ultimately giving rise to 
many forms of interaction among governmental and non-governmental actors.5 ‘Informal’ here 
does not refer to non-official channels, or a ‘hidden’ membership, but to the fact that an 
increasing number of arrangements in world politics are less bureaucratic and rely on non-
binding agreements. Informalization thus implies increased flexibility of structures and a more 
flexible decision-making process.  
 
The global governance of crime reflects this informalization process.  A global public 
policy network consisting of international organizations, states and non-state actors,6 is a 
concept followed in the Kimberley Process. The process brought together governmental and 
non-governmental regulations to govern sections of the diamond trade that had been 
                                                 
4 Kenneth Abbot and Duncan Snidal “International Regulation without international government. Improving IO 
Performance through Orchestration” Review of International Organizations 2010 (5): 315-344, 316. 
5 E.g Wolfgang H. Reinicke and Francis Deng, Critical Choices. The United Nations, Networks and the Future of 
Global Governance (Ottawa and others: International Development Research Centre, 2000).; Slaughter, A New 
World Order; Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg, "Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics," 
Global Governance 12 (2006): 185-203. 
6 Reinicke and Deng Critical Choices; Reinicke Global Public Policy.  
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unregulated before.7 Global networks of state actors that facilitate exchange about common 
policy problems8 have also become an established element of global crime governance, ranging 
from police cooperation to activities of the G7/8 against crime.9 Global crime governance today 
is transnational governance, relying on non-state actors and their orchestration.10 The FATF is 
one of the most prominent examples of these efforts to counter crime.  
 
While these different forms of policy networks vary in the degree of involvement of state and 
non-state actors, the tasks fulfilled, and the legal forms they take, they nonetheless all expose 
a new, networked way in how states tackle crime.11 Basically, governments can use these 
networks in two ways: They can try to stipulate change among network members, or they can 
try to use the power of the network as a whole to govern a specific issue area.  To make efficient 
use of networks, actors ideally combine these strategies and set up a network in which they 
have a strong influence on other network members, while the whole network has a strong 
influence on the whole issue area. This turns networking into a multilevel activity, and requires 
an ‘entrepreneurial’ approach to world politics: States cannot just refer to existing international 
forums or use long established means of cooperation. They need to cause wide-ranging change, 
                                                 
7 Virginia Haufler, “The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global Governance and 
Conflict Prevention,” Journal of Business Ethics 89, no. 4 (2009): 403-416.; Haufler, Virginia, “The Kimberley 
Process, Club Goods, and Public Enforcement of a Private Regime,” in Matthew Potoski and Aseem Prakash 
(eds.) Voluntary Programs. A Club Theory Perspective, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2009), 89-105.  
8 Slaughter A new World Order. 
9 Amadine Scherrer The G8 and Transnational Organized Crime (Ashgate: Edward Elgar, 2010).; Peter Andreas 
and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe. Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations (Oxford 
and others: Oxford University Press 2006)  
10 Author. 
11Miles Kahler Networked Politics. Agency, Power and Structure (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). 
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supported by other actors. But how can such networks been built and become a tool in 
countering crime? 
 
Institutional Entrepreneurship and Global Networking 
 
Researchers of organization studies have labelled the activity to bring networked, 
incremental change as ‘institutional entrepreneurship’. By focusing on the power of networked 
actors and collaboration, this strand of research bridged rationalist and constructivist arguments 
to provide a comprehensive explanation of institutional change. Institutional entrepreneurship 
refers to the broad ‘activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional 
arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing 
ones’.12 These actors aim at changing their environment by rearranging institutional 
arrangements, thus changing basic rules of the game. 13 Power is an important element of 
institutional entrepreneurship, but the actors involved are usually not part of a structure that 
visibly shows coercion – at least in the first place. The power of institutional entrepreneurs is 
                                                 
12  Steven Maguire, Cynthia Hardy and Thomas Lawrence, "Institutional Entrepreneurship in Emerging Fields: 
HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada", Academy of Management Journal, 47 (2004), 657-679, 657. 
13 Bernard Leca and Philippe Naccache, "A Critical Realist Approach To Institutional Entrepreneurship", 
Organization 13, no. 5 (2006): 627-651; Julie Battilana, Bernard Leca and Eva Boxenbaum, Agency and 
Institutions: A Review of Institutional Entrepreneurship (Cambridge: Harvard Business School, 2008); Raghu 
Garud, Cynthia Hardy and Steve Maguire, “Institutional Entrepreneurship as Embedded Agency: An Introduction 
to the Special Issue”, Organization Studies 28, no.7 (2007), 957-969; Cynthia Hardy and Steve Maguire, 
“Institutional Entrepreneurship”, in Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Kerstin Sahlin and Roy Suddaby, (eds) 
The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2008), 198-217. 
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derived from their relative position to others, and they draw on different dimensions of power 
in the network.14  
 
Networking is a crucial tool for institutional entrepreneurs: It emphasizes the relational 
aspect in bringing change, and the ties among its members can be used to collaborate as well 
as to execute power. Institutional entrepreneurs thus use different means to establish policies 
that conform to their own ideas: explicit norms may stand alongside technical analyses, 
educational trainings used to facilitate new administrative procedures. In particular the 
structural position in a network is important for institutional entrepreneurs: Central positions 
allow extensive and diverse incoming information, while they enable easy communication of 
ideas and goals within the network.15 This enables a monitoring of activities within and outside 
the network, while it also benefits the central actor. Power in a network can be used to secure 
good and central positions, to allow information exchange or the spread of norms. Institutional 
entrepreneurs can gain support through financial transfers to other network members, they can 
lobby for formal network regulations that support their position, or they can become central 
actors due to knowledge asymmetries. The most decisive factor of institutional 
entrepreneurship in a network is not the application of new instruments, but the continuous 
influence within a shared environment shaped by frequent interactions and common aims. 
                                                 
14 Thomas B. Lawrence, "Power, Institutions and Organizations", in Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, 
Kerstin Sahlin and Roy Suddaby (eds.) The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (Thousand Okas: 
Sage, 2008), 170-197, 174.; Jens Beckert "Agency, Entrepreneurs, and Institutional Change. The Role of Strategic 
Choice and Institutionalized Practices in Organizations", Organization Studies 20, no. 5 (1999), 777-799, 792. 
15 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler and Alexander H. Montgomery "Network Analysis for International  
Relations," International Organization 63, no. 3 (2009): 559-592.; Deborah Avant and Oliver Westerwinter, The 
New Power Politics: Networks, Governance and Global Security. (Manuscript, December 2012). 
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Successful institutional entrepreneurship results in wide-ranging political change, 
changed global agendas or cross-national policy diffusion.16 This diffusion is not restricted to 
policies only, but may include organizational changes or seemingly technical issues. 
Governance networks can use knowledge and persuade others, they can offer financial support 
if others align to their policy goals, or they can establish legal or cultural standards to which 
others comply. Institutional entrepreneurship therefore profits from the informalization of 
world politics, given that formal rules often allow specific rights to weaker parties, while 
informalization benefits those who have occupied a high social position in a stratified social 
system - a position that institutional entrepreneurs usually strive for to facilitate change.  
 
Global governance of crime, today and in history, is the outcome of institutional 
entrepreneurship in different versions: When the British had been a major power until the 19th 
century, they initiated global prohibition regimes, in particular those related to slavery and 
maritime piracy. In particular in the 20th century, the United States took the position as an 
institutional entrepreneur and ‘exporter’ of many international regulations against crime, for 
example related to corruption, narcotic drugs, terrorism or human trafficking.17 The difference 
between historical and current outcomes of institutional entrepreneurship, however, is their 
                                                 
16 Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett, eds. The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).; Sharman, "Power, Discourse and Policy Diffusion"; Covadonga 
Meseguer and Fabrizio Gilardi "What is new in the study of policy diffusion?" Review of International Political 
Economy 16, no. 3 (2009): 527-543. 
17 Ethan A. Nadelmann, “The Role of the United States in the International Enforcement of Criminal Law,” 
Harvard International Law Journal 31, no. 1 (1990): 37-76; Cornelius Friesendorf, US Foreign Policy and the 
War on Drugs. Displacing the cocaine and heroine industry (London, New York: Routledge, 2007). 
Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe.; Author. 
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design: While the interstate treaty has been the most important tool in early activities against 
crime, the current attempts to counter crime show a networked structure, and are not necessarily 
based on hard law. This is not to say that hard and soft law, diplomacy, power and treaties 
would exclude each other. Rather, the more formal instruments of treaties that reflected global 
power in early global crime control have given way to more informal arrangements, like global 
networks, in which power is nonetheless still present and used.  
 
Problems related to Global Networking 
 
While institutional entrepreneurs can draw on networks in a flexible way, this form of 
cooperation is not without specific costs. A main reason for formalized cooperation with 
binding contracts are commitment problems, making sure that all parties fulfill the agreement. 
In contrast, networks apply soft law and are more flexible with regard to membership, but this 
also lowers the costs of defection. While the flexibility of networks seems to be an advantage, 
it also needs incentives and other measures that ensure the commitment of network members. 
At the same time, networks might only play out their advantages over time as they do not have 
the fixed benefits and gains that other, formal treaties have. Initiators of networks need to invest 
in them early and constantly, to make sure the networking pays off to them and other members 
in the long run.  
 
Initiating and designing policy networks therefore needs to consider a) initiation 
problems and b) commitment problems. Both are not independent from each other, and in 
particular the initiator of networks needs to tackle both of them. But while initiation problems 
mainly relate to early stages of the network’s existence, commitment problems are continuous 
problem that might even increase as the number of network members and activities grow. A 
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design that considers these commitment problems and, ideally, diffuses responsibility to all 
members, is therefore necessary, as a network initiator is unlikely to be able monitoring 
commitment alone constantly.  
 
As the FATF is usually considered to be a success in global standard setting and 
resulting policy change, and even discussed as a model for new initiatives, this article analyzes 
how such network problems have been solved to counter money laundering. Money laundering 
is usually conceived as a ‘support crime’, enabling other, more severe forms of criminal 
activity, and represents the process by which the criminal origin of money is hidden by 
converting it to an income that seems to be generated by licit activity.  Laundering money thus 
enables criminals to effectively use the gains derived from illegal activities like drug 
trafficking, maritime piracy, weapons trafficking or the financing of terrorism.18 Chasing this 
money is important to find and destroy criminal businesses, and detecting this money also 
diminishes the economic revenue of illicit activities and makes them less attractive.19 The 
United States first identified money laundering as an international area of concern, but also 
witnessed substantial resistance from other states. The global anti-money laundering agenda 
provides an important example of how an entrepreneurial approach to world politics helped 
overcoming obstacles. At the same time, as any entrepreneurial activity, the success of the 
FATF model is not necessarily replicable.  
 
                                                 
18 e.g. K. L. Gardner, "Fighting terrorism the FATF way," Global Governance 13, no. 3 (2007), 325-345. 
19  Michael Levi, "Money Laundering and its Regulation," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 582, no. 1 (2002): 181-194; Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money. The Fight 




Incentives to Initiate the FATF Network 
 
The initiation of global regulations against money laundering had been a process of many years, 
has been initiated stepwise and in different forums. The United States had strong incentives to 
regulate money laundering internationally, creating a level playing field for banks, but also 
guaranteeing that other states pursued a policy that corresponded to the American approach of 
countering crime. The domestic history of global anti-money laundering started with the 
American Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, establishing customer identification measures for all 
accounts in the United States.20 In 1986, the Money Laundering Control Act criminalized 
money laundering, foremost with the aim to prosecute drug trafficking. A remaining problem, 
however, was the growing amount of international financial transactions. Even if the United 
States would enforce its own laws rigorously, transactions from other countries could not be 
controlled effectively. Moreover, the banking sector complained massively about a growing 
burden of paper work and diminishing banking privacy at times when financial markets were 
becoming globalized and increasingly competitive.21  
 
Domestic Incentives for the FATF  
 
One part of the 1986 legislation was therefore requirement that the Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Bank had to consult with other central banks about the problem of money laundering 
and the general responsibility of banks. After initial reluctance on the part of other banking 
                                                 
20 Michael Levi, "Pecunia non Olet: Cleansing the Money Launderers from the Temple," Crime, Law and Social 
Change, 16: 3 (1991), 217-302: 249. 
21 Wyrsch, "Treasury Regulation", 530. 
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chairmen, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision finally issued a statement in 1988 that 
mentioned the importance of knowing the customer in order to avoid suspicious transactions 
and to cooperate with law enforcement.22 The statement was drafted by the representatives of 
the United States in the committee23 and it became one piece in the mosaic of an evolving 
international order against money laundering. Subsequent activities of the United States and 
other countries have referred to it frequently.  
 
The American government’s intent to foster international cooperation against money 
laundering was also reflected in the 1988 Omnibus Drug Act and the so-called ‘Kerry 
Amendment’. This amendment added a section that called for increased cooperation, 
international surveillance of large currency transactions and sanctions toward no-cooperative 
countries.24 The intention was to ensure adequate records on large transactions of US Dollars 
worldwide, and the disclosure of this information to American law enforcement.25 In 1989, the 
aims of the amendment were supplemented by a report to a Subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. Arguing that fighting money laundering would be the key to 
                                                 
22 Reuter and Truman, Chasing Dirty Money, 80. 
23 "Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, Committee on 
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate: Money Laundering. The U.S. Government Is Responding to the Problem," 
General Accounting Office, Washington, 1991, 61. 
24 “Report to the Chairman”, General Accounting Office, 16; Gerard Wyrsch, "Treasury Regulation of 
International Wire Transfer and Money Laundering: A Case for a Permanent Moratorium," Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 20, no. 3 (1991-1992): 515-535, 528) 
25 Bruce Zagaris, "Dollar Diplomacy: International Enforcement of Money Movement and Related Matters - A 
United States Perspective," George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 22 (1988): 465-552, 
476. 
 13
fighting drug trafficking, the need for increased cooperation was stated frequently, while 
international negotiations and restrictions on global banking secrecy were demanded.26 
 
 Already in 1988, the United States issued a first statement at the G7 summit in Toronto 
referring to the need to ‘curb money laundering’. Participants of the summit declared their 
support for    
 
‘the initiative of the Government of the United States for a special task force to be convened to propose methods 
of improving cooperation in all areas including national, bilateral, and multilateral efforts in the fight against 
narcotics’.27   
 
Other Incentives to Initiate the FATF 
 
The incentives that led the United States to push anti-money laundering policies via the G7 
were not primarily linked to domestic reasons, but to a lack of international alternatives.  
Traditional instruments as bilateral law enforcement cooperation or developing mutual legal 
assistance treaties had proven to be ineffective: Foreign governments were generally reluctant 
to grant assistance to drug-related law enforcement cooperation when the death penalty was 
included in the American 1988 Omnibus Drug Act. Also, even cooperative countries referred 
to the needs of their own banking sectors and the need for privacy, and foreign courts partly 
dismissed assistance that American law enforcement was seeking from the respective 
                                                 
26 “Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy," Subcommittee on Terrorism Narcotics and International 
Operations, Washington, 1989, 12, 120. 
27 Political Declaration: Securing Democracy. Toronto Summit, 20 June 1988, Toronto (G7), 
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1988toronto/political.html (accessed 05 July 2014). 
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governments.28 Bilateral cooperation was further undermined when Congress resisted to enter 
some of the mutual legal assistance treaties, for example with the Bahamas or Mexico, because 
it seemed politically problematic.29 Finally, mutual legal assistance treaties had also inherent 
weaknesses: They would not necessarily affect banking practice, so that the United States could 
only trust the agreements, but could not influence foreign banking laws and practices in detail. 
It was also problematic to establish effective sanctioning mechanisms along such treaties.30  
 
Taken together, the growing number of international financial transactions made it 
ineffective for the United States to rely only on a domestic approach of money laundering 
control. Yet, bilateral treaties provided no way of assuring that foreign banking procedures 
would be aligned with American regulations.31 These reasons contributed to the growing efforts 
of the United States to counter money laundering on a multilateral base.  
 
Being the central network formed to fight money laundering, the inception of the FATF 
in 1989 was formally proposed by the French who held the presidency of the G7 at that time. 
The issue of money laundering had mainly been prepared by the Americans and involved visits 
of foreign delegations to Washington.32 Today, 34 countries and 2 regional organizations are 
member of the FATF. The first American delegation to the FATF consisted of members of the 
Treasury, Justice, and State Departments as well as the Federal Reserve. Their objective was 
                                                 
28 Nadelmann, "Unlaundering Dirty Money”. 
29 Zagaris, "Dollar Diplomacy", 478-503. 
30 “Report to the Chairman”, General Accounting Office, 56. 
31 “Report to the Chairman”, General Accounting Office, 57-8. 
32 Thierry Godefroy and Pierre Lascoumes, eds., Le Capitalisme Clandestin. L'Illusoire Régulation des Places 
Offshore (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 2004). 
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to encourage the criminalization of money laundering and increase the possibilities for cross-
national law enforcement, as well as fostering broad international cooperation against money 
laundering.33 
 
With regard to the initiation problem of international networks, the FATF shows that 
the United States had no domestic alternative to an international regulation of money 
laundering. Also, given the sovereignty of countries in overseeing their banks, even treaties on 
money laundering regulation, changed banking practice and law enforcement cooperation 
would have been futile. There was, however, a clear sense of where most money related to drug 
offences (the initial focus of the FATF) was generated – in Western countries where drugs are 
foremost consumed – and where the money would be laundered – in offshore banking centers. 
Incentives for cooperation where thus high, while the tools for cooperation were restricted. 
 
 
Incentives to Commit to the FATF Network 
 
The creation of the FATF lead to the emergence of money laundering as a prominent 
international policy problem. Commitment of states was nonetheless necessary to counter this 
crime. However, over the course of time, it was not only the United States who took over 
monitoring tasks, but reviews and sanctions became a multilateral responsibility and has also 
been delegated to non-state actors.  
 
Incentives for governmental commitment to the FATF  
                                                 
33 “Report to the Chairman”, General Accounting Office, 59. 
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With regard to internal monitoring, the structure of the FATF allows expert exchange and 
discussion forums on the most effective methods to counter money laundering.34 Publications 
and studies of the FATF make it an important source of knowledge on money laundering.35 
Meetings are usually attended by financial regulators, law enforcement representatives, and 
civil servants from national Treasury or Justice Departments.36 The activities are based on the 
so-called 40 recommendations, initially published in 1990, later revised and supplemented by 
counter-terrorist financing and other crimes. FATF recommendations represent a soft form of 
governance and are formally non-binding. Being reworked and refined over time, they cover 
four main areas related to prevent and prosecute money laundering: they are concerned with 
the legal system and targeted at criminalizing money laundering nationally; and they list 
measures to be taken by financial institutions and the related non-financial sector.  
 
 Commitment to the recommendations is ensured by a review process: FATF members 
are required to submit self-assessments, and they are regularly peer reviewed by other members 
and the secretariat. In the case of non-compliance, measures include reporting on deficiencies 
in FATF meetings, official letters or missions sent to the country. Instruments also involve the 
binding request to banks to pay special attention to all financial transactions to or from the 
                                                 
34 Sharman, The Money Laundry; Jason C. Sharman, “Power, Discourse and Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money 
Laundering in Developing States,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2011): 635-656.; 
Tsingou, "Global Financial Governance". 
35 Kerwer and Hülsse, "'How International Organizations Rule the World". 
36 Michael Levi and William Gilmore, "Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of Mutual  
Evaluation: A New Paradigm for Crime Control?" in Marc Pieth, ed. Financing Terrorism (Doordrecht:  
Springer, 2002), 87-114: 95. 
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specific countries.37 The internal discussions and review procedures also ensure that 
monitoring and oversight is socialized. All states and related transgovernmental bodies are 
responsible for developing and policing standards.  
  
 The network also subjects non-members to its review procedures: From the late 1990s 
until 2006, these countries have been monitored through an assessment in the framework of 
the non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCT) process. A first report was issued in 2000 
and included a list of countries that seemed to be non-compliant to the recommendations. These 
and other subsequently listed countries were neither members of the FATF nor did they sign 
up for the recommendations. Instead, the NCCT process was a ‘naming and shaming’ approach 
towards non-members, supplemented by counter-measures and sanctions.38 The process was 
heavily criticized because it implied that a club of countries assesses non-member compliance 
to its own rules.39 As a consequence, future reviews have been partially transferred to 
multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.40 The FATF 
established the International Cooperation Review Group that further conducted assessments of 
countries, but on a different basis and with modified rating categories. In recent ratings, in 
particular Iran and North Korea are targeted as having important deficiencies in their banking 
system.41  
                                                 
37 Tsingou, "Global Financial Governance".  
38 “Report on non-cooperative countries and territories”, FATF, Paris, 2000: 7-9. 
39 Levi and Gilmore, "Terrorist Finance," 103-4. 
40 Gardner, "Fighting terrorism," 339-40; Reuter and Truman, Chasing Dirty Money, 167-8. 
41  “Public Statement - 25 February 2011”, FATF, Paris, 2011 http://www.fatf- 
gafi.org/document/11/0,3746,en_32250379_32236992_47221771_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed  
1 March 2011);  “Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: update on-going process,” FATF, Paris, 2011,  
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 Monitoring of commitment is also supported through the creation of regional networks 
that fight money laundering. These FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) have been established 
in all regions worldwide since 1990. The Caribbean regional body provides one example for 
socialized anti-money laundering efforts and the influence of the United States, as the country 
and the FATF supported the Caribbean Financial Action Taskforce (CFATF) from the start.42 
Two years before the official creation in 1992, a meeting in Aruba gave rise to the organization, 
and its 19 recommendations modeled after the FATF.43 As the General Accounting Office 
reported on this event: 
 
‘[…] the United States is cooperating with several countries in a Caribbean region anti-
money-laundering initiative. Participants at a June 1990 conference agreed to propose 
that their governments adopt the 40 Financial Action Task Force recommendations, 
supplemented with 21 draft recommendations (tailored to the region) developed at the 
conference’.44 
 
The CFATF was thus based on an external initiative, and given the multiple attempts to 
cooperate with Caribbean countries in the 1980s against money laundering, the United States 
had a strong interest in the formation of such a group and the acknowledgement of common 
                                                 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/49/0,3746,en_32250379_32236992_47221809_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 
March 2011). Iran and North Korea are two of the very few countries that are not member to any part of the FATF 
network.  
42 Canada, Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom, see CFATF (1995) Annual Report 1994-1995, 
https://www.cfatf-gafic.org/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=416&lang=en (accessed 4 August 2014), 5. 
43 James R. Richards, Transnational Criminal Organizations, Cybercrime and Money Laundering. A Handbook 
for Law Enforcement Officers, Auditors and Financial Investigators (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 1999), 233-7. 
44 “Report to the Chairman”, General Accounting Office, 62. 
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standards. As donor countries, FATF members provided funding for the secretariat and its 
operations. For many years, the smallest amount given by a supporting country still exceeded 
the membership contribution, still the organization had difficulties in raising their membership 
fees.45 The initial founders of the FATF facilitated global activity by investing resources and 
technical knowledge.  
 
Incentives for non-governmental commitment to the FATF 
 
While these membership processes relate to state members only, a large part of monitoring the 
financial system is carried out on the subnational level, by non-state actors as banks and the 
financial professions. Related legislation or institutions have been introduced in nearly all states 
worldwide as customers have to fill out forms and banks must submit suspicious transaction 
records. The link to financial institutions as addressees of FATF recommendations turns the 
FATF network to an important example of how international institutions as orchestrator use 
intermediaries to target criminals and terrorists.46 At the same time, this organizational 
principle turned anti-money laundering into an issue area with a high degree of public-private 
interaction and to a prime example of transnational governance.47 
                                                 
45 CFATF (2002) Annual Report 2001-2002, https://www.cfatf-
gafic.org/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=416&lang=en (accessed 4 August 2014), 49. 
CFATF (2007) Annual Report 2006-2007, https://www.cfatf-
gafic.org/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=416&lang=en (accessed 4 August 2014), 24.  
46  Kenneth Abott, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal and Bernhard Zangl “Orchestration: Global Governance 
through Intermediaries” (Working Paper, 2012, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2125452, accessed November 7, 
2014), 2-3.  
47 Karin Svedberg Helgesson and Ulrika Mörth, eds. Securitization, Accountability and Risk Management. 
Transforming the Public Security Domain (London: Routledge, 2012). 
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 To commit banks to implement national regulations (which are based on FATF 
recommendations), and to record and investigate suspicious transactions, banks are monitored 
by financial intelligence units. The establishment of these organizations was initially only a by-
product of anti-money laundering efforts, but since 2003 FATF recommendations refer to the 
operation of these units as element of national anti-money laundering efforts. This reference 
was mainly due to activities of the Egmont group, a worldwide organization of 139 financial 
intelligence units, formed in Brussels in 1995 and based on an American and Belgian 
initiative.48 The Egmont group established the definition of Financial Intelligence Units, best 
practices and other standards relating to them. The Egmont group represents an institution for 
exchange and monitoring, adding a further, important layer of transgovernmental contacts to 
the FATF network and its work.  
 
 The FATF has a multilayered network structure that diffuses responsibility to ensure 
commitment across levels and members: First, the FATF and its members form a core of the 
network of 34 countries with equal membership rights49, and in which the United States clearly 
took a lead. Second, there exists a network of FATF regional bodies found worldwide, and 
their respective member countries. FATF countries are partly member to these regional 
organizations and finance important activities. Third, there exists an additional layer of 
                                                 
48 International Monetary Fund and World Bank, Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview  
(Washington: World Bank, 2004), 19; William C. Gilmore Dirty Money. The Evolution of International Measures 
to Counter Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, 3rd edition (Strassbourg: Council of Europe  
Publishing, 2008); “About us”, Egmont Group, Brussels 2014, http://www.egmontgroup.org/about (accessed 7 
November 2014). 
49 European Union and Gulf Cooperation Coucil are non-country members of the FATF. 
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observers and associates, including countries, international organizations and other actors 
concerned with money laundering. These participate in FATF events and disseminate anti-
money laundering policies in their own activities. Within around 20 years, the initial FATF 
grew to a network of regional bodies, international organizations, transgovernmental networks, 
and includes almost all countries worldwide. The list of members, associates and observers 
ranges from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, from Europol to the World Bank, from the International 
Organization of the Securities Commission to the Egmont Network of Financial Intelligence 
Units. All in all, the United States successfully managed to create and shape a global network 
that nowadays serves as a prototype of networked governance.  
 
The central position of the United States leads to the ability of effectively communicating 
foreign policy goals related to money laundering. In 1991, the General Accounting Office 
concluded that ‘There has been some progress on the international front in recent years’ and 
‘International negotiations are leading to significant agreements’.50 The United States 
supported the start of and early agenda setting of the global network. The design of the FATF 
network, its exchange and multilayered monitoring ensured that the political goals were spread 
widely and that actors were committed to them. 
 
Limits of Transferability  
 
The FATF network could overcome initiation and commitment problems in a unique way. With 
regard to the initiation of the FATF, the United States invested political and financial resources 
as well as expertise to start global, and later regional, networks that tackled money laundering. 
                                                 
50 “Report to the Chairman”, General Accounting Office, 2, 5. 
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This was the outcome of domestic politics that demanded international activity, while all usual 
instruments had been unsuitable to reach this political goal. It is rare, however, that these 
conditions for the initiation of a network are met. Domestic preferences for internationalization 
are not always as pronounced as in the case of money laundering, where decades of domestic 
regulation were ineffective due to the internationalization of financial markets. Moreover, not 
always are countries willing to finance new institutions with an unclear outcome as this was 
the case of the FATF.  
 
 The talk about money laundering, and the successive introduction of worldwide rules 
and regulations related to the FATF network also opened up possibilities that reach beyond 
criminal finance. As the FATF regulations established a dense net of control about customer 
data and transfers, they also became an instrument for executing financial sanctions more 
effectively, irrespective of whether these are linked to money laundering or based on other 
reasons. As such, anti-money laundering regulations are instruments that, once introduced, can 
be used for very different purposes, from tracing tax avoidance to sanctioning countries. This 
added value of the FATF makes continuous political support of central FATF members likely. 
Global policy networks that cannot provide this added value are less likely to exist as long and 
expand that successfully.  
 
 An even more complex task is ensuring commitment while not overburdening the 
initiator of the network. The FATF network – perhaps because it had been so innovative at the 
time it was established, has effectively a structure that is based on intermediaries, different 
levels of surveillance and crosses the public-private divide. The network introduced formal 
regulations that corresponded to American laws, established a forum for expert exchange and 
used financial transfers to build up different regional networks. Members and non-members 
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needed to comply, otherwise being threatened by financial sanctions. The process involves a 
multitude of actors, serves different regulatory aims and includes soft law, naming-and-
shaming strategies and transnational regulation.  
 
 Despite being referred to as a prime example of global governance networks51, anti-
money laundering regulations are dependent on a specific context in which they were invented 
and on which they can draw. Other policy areas related to crime (and beyond) are more likely 
to expose different characteristics and configurations. For instance, the FATF network was 
initiated by a minority of powerful states, not by a diverse group of states, by international 
organizations or non-state actors. It had a clear focus on developing expertise and is not 
primarily a negotiation forum, yet these technical regulations are developed with a backing of 
those states that are the most important financial markets. Regulations in these markets are 
difficult to be ignored and any sanctions taken will influence other economies strongly. This is 
not a given in other areas of global crime governance, where the financial sector cannot be used 
as intermediary for governing criminals. The continuous expansion of the FATF shows that 
tracing money now becomes a ‘catch-all solution’ to many crimes – whether it is effective 
might be debatable52, but alternatives are in short supply, too.  
 
 Though successful in the FATF case, a weak point for other networks might be the 
reliance on soft law. While technically non-binding, the recommendations are based on a clear 
agreement among FATF member states. The FATF did not start as a soft law initiative for a 
diverse set of countries, but as an agreement among some states to enforce these soft rules – 
                                                 
51 Slaughter, A New World Order; Reinecke, Global Public Policy.  
52 Michael Levi “Combating the Financing of Terrorism: A History and Assessment of the Control of ‘Threat 
Finance’” British Journal of Criminology 2010, 50 (4), 650-669. 
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eventually also among other states. The asymmetry created by the initial FATF network, helped 
establishing the rules, be them formally binding or non-binding. A soft law initiative that starts 
from a broader membership base could be less effective, as it needs to bridge across more 
diverse member interests. Common rules and the commitment to enforcement is harder to 
achieve in such cases. Most importantly, the naming-and-shaming strategy of the FATF has 
been successful in causing policy change in non-member countries. However, given the FATF 
recommendations include sanctioning power, naming-and-shaming by the FATF has always 
been more than just a discourse. Countries that had been listed on the blacklist were well aware 
that this listing is a first, diplomatic step and that other steps like sanctioning might follow. 
Given that the FATF can cut-off a national financial market from others, any reaction to 
naming-and-shaming is not independent from the ‘harder’ tools that FATF could apply. Other 
cases of naming and shaming might be less effective if no backing by other instruments exists.  
 
 Finally, despite the fact that FATF regulations influenced policy making world-wide, 
the effectiveness and the legitimacy of these regulations is still not undisputed. The inclusion 
of banks and other financial professions has led to a transnational regulatory regime, leaving 
implementation to non-state actors. These are not always well-equipped to take over policing 
tasks, and who is ultimately responsible for failures is unclear. Moreover, the 
acknowledgement of FATF regulations worldwide is not necessarily a signal of legitimacy, 
and many countries, including the United States and FATF members, might follow rules on 
paper but not in practice. These difficulties, however, are not unique to the FATF, but remain 
persistent problems of global governance in all issue areas.   
 
 
Conclusions: The FATF and Policy Learning   
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The analysis of the FATF shows that research and practice benefits from taking into account 
the conditions that accompany specific networks. The FATF has an impressive track record of 
expertise and policy-development, rarely achieved by other global governance networks. As 
the article showed, it is a particularly prominent example of how state and non-state actors can 
network globally and across different levels. Yet, from a policy-oriented perspective this 
success does not imply that the FATF would provide the best example for future global 
networks.   
 
 
TABLE 1 about here 
 
Table 1 lists the central challenges for FATF networking and the way they have been tackled. 
The initiation of the FATF was not only supported by a powerful group of countries, but the 
gains that were to be achieved – like security of financial markets and countering crime – were 
particularly attractive to those countries where most drug- and crime related money was 
entering the financial system. A lack of alternatives helped the FATF to gain momentum. The 
multilevel structure of the FATF, linked to monitoring and effective sanctioning further 
allowed ensuring commitment to the network and its rules. The combined presence of these 
conditions for initiation and commitment is rare, which puts limits on the transferability of the 
FATF to other areas of global governance.  
 
 The FATF nonetheless provides an important case for policy learning, when paying 
attention to these background conditions. With regard to initiation, global networks seem to 
need a dedicated political supporter from the beginning. Initial political support is necessary 
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for all forms of international cooperation, yet given that the network structure is more flexible, 
this support will be needed for a longer period of time. Moreover, policy preferences must be 
focused, so that commitment of the initiator and all those joining the network can be monitored 
easily. The network must allow for effective sharing of the burden at some point, so that 
monitoring is not carried out only by the initiating actor. This is particularly important with 
regard to dissent in the network, as the less coherent policy interests of members are, the more 
likely is defection and non-commitment. As a result, even ambitious initiatives against crime 
might become irrelevant over time.  
 
 While this article focused on the FATF as a prominent case of global networking, future 
research could evaluate the limits of other global policy networks from a perspective of lesson-
drawing and policy learning. For this purpose, successful examples of global networking are 
not necessarily better suited than less successful ones – including the question what ‘success’ 
ultimately means. Moreover, it is also important to have a closer perspective at the ‘life cycle’ 
of networks and a comparison of different examples, as conditions, structures and results 
change over time. The Kimberley Process, for instance, was initially a prime example for global 
policy networks. In recent years it lost legitimacy and support among those non-governmental 
activists that initially pressured for its existence. The Kimberley Process thus did not reward 
its initiators.53 Moreover, the process could also not ensure commitment of all participants: 
Venezuela has been a known defector of the scheme, and was never confronted with harsh 
sanctions as FATF defectors would be. This is also due to the fact that some sanctioning tools 
of the FATF – in particular restricting access to global financial markets – are not available to 
other global policy networks.  
                                                 
53 Virginia Haufler, “The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme”; Author 
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 Most prominently expressed in the idea that ‘it takes a network to destroy a network’,54 
new forms of cooperation have been discussed in global crime governance for a while. The 
growth of networks like the FATF seem to lend support to such an approach. As this article 
shows, however, there are limits of lesson-drawing from existent global policy networks. These 
limits exist with regard to policies, but also with regard to scholarly knowledge on the success 
and failure of networks. They include networks related to global crime governance and those 
in other areas of global governance. Future research should compare and examine networks 
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